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The theoretical virtues of simulationism| old_uid | 19849 |
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| title | The theoretical virtues of simulationism |
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| start_date | 2021/12/16 |
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| schedule | 10h30-12h |
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| online | no |
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| details | Séminaire international |
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| summary | The Simulation Theory of Memory (STM) can be seen as a proposal for ameliorating the concept of remembering. This amelioration would be the case because, according to STM, remembering, very much as prospecting imaginatively the personal future, is a way of 'traveling' in subjective time -- a view grounded in empirical research on the operations of a shared neurocognitive mechanism for imagining and remembering episodically. In this talk, I want to investigate the theoretical virtues of STM. More specifically, I want to do two things. First, I want to compare the explanatory simplicity of STM vis-a-vis the Causal Theory of Memory (CTM). Finally, I want to approach two objections to the STM. First, the change-of-subject objection. Second, the 'instability' objection that motivates Trace Minimalism. |
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| responsibles | Perret |
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