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Strategic self-deception| title | Strategic self-deception |
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| start_date | 2024/10/04 |
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| schedule | 11h15-12h30 |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | 6th floor room |
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| summary | This paper develops a model of strategic self-deception in a competitive setting. We consider a situation where an individual can acquire information about his own ability before deciding whether to engage in competition with another agent. The individual can manipulate the type of information acquired, influencing his own beliefs, which in turn can be beneficial for influencing the beliefs and actions of competitors. We propose an intrapersonal game framework to study this phenomenon and show that self-deception arises endogenously as a strategic choice. Our model sheds light on the motivations and consequences of self-deception in strategic interactions and contributes to the understanding of the role of overconfidence in competitive environments. |
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| responsibles | Saucet, Pejsachowicz |
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Workflow history| from state (1) | to state | comment | date |
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| submitted | published | | 2024/10/03 13:06 UTC |
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