|
Generalised remembering| title | Generalised remembering |
|---|
| start_date | 2024/10/31 |
|---|
| schedule | 12h15-13h45 |
|---|
| online | no |
|---|
| location_info | on Zoom |
|---|
| summary | Recollections of our personal past are often impressionistic, not so much for lack of detail but for a certain generality of subject matter. If you've made a journey many times, you may ‘relive’ it through memory without reliving a particular occasion. I offer an account of (what I will call) generalised remembering that treats it as a semantic phenomenon. In particular, it is the construction of an event representation that is temporally imprecise in virtue of referential indeterminacy. I recommend a plurivaluationist account of such indeterminacy that can fold into our broader theory of memory accuracy. Though distinct from the framework itself, I urge theorists to see generalised and specific recollections of events as psychologically continuous. As such, even resolutely systems-oriented projects ought not shelve generalised remembering as a separate kind or afterthought. And this also motivates the semantic account of generalised remembering over accounts which would suggest a qualitative difference in content or kind. I conclude that generalised remembering, though differentiated only by its semantic profile, warrants the attention it is slowly beginning to receive. |
|---|
| responsibles | Kourken, Andonovski |
|---|
Workflow history| from state (1) | to state | comment | date |
|---|
| submitted | published | | 2024/10/23 11:53 UTC |
| |
|