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Fairness vs. Simplicity in Appointment Rules| title | Fairness vs. Simplicity in Appointment Rules |
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| start_date | 2024/12/06 |
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| schedule | 11h15-12h30 |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | 6th floor room |
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| summary | C.Alos-Ferrer, S. Barberà , D. Coelho High-stakes conflicts between firms and countries are often settled through structured bargaining protocols, for example for the selection of arbitrators. Those protocols are extensive form games with perfect information, and they are judged on the merits of their subgame-perfect equilibria, e.g.efficiency. However, real-life agents often fail to implement backwards induction and exhibit other-regarding preferences. In a large experiment, we compare two prominent protocols and show that those concerns affect outcomes. Bargaining protocols whose equilibria are unfair (in a maximin sense) fare poorly compared to those favoring compromises. However, lengthy protocols are at a disadvantage because they elicit non-equilibrium behavior. |
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| responsibles | Saucet, Pejsachowicz |
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Workflow history| from state (1) | to state | comment | date |
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| submitted | published | | 2024/12/04 17:08 UTC |
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