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A hyperintensional setting for ignorance| title | A hyperintensional setting for ignorance |
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| start_date | 2025/03/04 |
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| schedule | 14h-16h |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | salle de conférence de l'IHPST |
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| summary | In our presentation, we propose an analysis of ignorance as a hyperintensional notion. In situations where two propositions are logically equivalent, an agent may be ignorant of one proposition while not of the other. To formalize this idea, we adopt a topic-sensitive semantics that allows us to model an agent's attitude towards the subject matter of a proposition. Within this framework, we consider three logical systems defined by standard Kripke semantics, which aim to account for three forms of ignorance: ignorance whether, ignorance as unknown truth, and disbelieving ignorance. As an application of our approach, we address the problem of logical omniscience reframed in terms of ignorance. This framework permits one to represent an agent's ability to grasp the subject matter of propositions, thereby bridging the gap between traditional relational approaches to representing ignorance and intuitive insights into how grasping influences one's state of ignorance. |
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| responsibles | Poggiolesi |
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Workflow history| from state (1) | to state | comment | date |
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| submitted | published | | 2025/03/04 15:21 UTC |
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