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An argument for generationism about memory justification| title | An argument for generationism about memory justification |
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| start_date | 2022/12/22 |
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| schedule | 16h15-17h45 |
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| online | yes |
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| visio | https://ruhr-uni-bochum.zoom.us/j/91270017621?pwd=SVRFUEpqZnoxZ0RSazkyQ1ZVY202QT09 |
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| location_info | via zoom |
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| summary | Memory is often seen as epistemically preservative in that it only preserves the justification that originates in some other, non-mnemonic source. The opposite view, generationism, according to which memory can also generate justification on its own, has been defended by a variety of authors in recent years. For memory to be epistemically generative, there have to generative cases: memories which justify beliefs where the justification is not due to some prior source. The cases of memory that have been thus far suggested as candidates for generative cases can be shown to be at best only superficially generative. In our paper, we consider two new candidates for epistemically generative cases of memory, memories resulting from event completion and memory consolidation, and argue that, although these cases are the most promising candidates, whether they count as generative cases of memory in particular depends on how to understand the relationship between memory and imagination. |
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| responsibles | Righetti, Werning, Kourken, Andonovski |
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Workflow history| from state (1) | to state | comment | date |
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| submitted | published | | 2022/12/22 11:38 UTC |
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