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Delayed Feedback on Tax Audits: Effects on Compliance, Decision Times, and Information Acquisition| title | Delayed Feedback on Tax Audits: Effects on Compliance, Decision Times, and Information Acquisition |
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| start_date | 2023/04/07 |
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| schedule | 11h15-12h30 |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | MSE 6th Floor Room |
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| summary | In experimental research on tax behavior audits usually occur directly after filing taxes, and feedback on the consequences of an audit is provided immediately. In reality, audits can happen within a much longer period of time. This difference in time lags between filing and audit feedback may play a crucial role with regard to the external validity of experimental results. In two studies we investigated the effect of delayed audit feedback on tax compliance by varying tax rates, audit probabilities, and fine rates, as these factors are known to have a strong influence on tax compliance. Furthermore, specific attention was paid to the process of information acquisition before making compliance decisions. The results reveal that compliance in delayed feedback conditions was considerably higher than in case of immediate feedback. In addition, lower tax rate, higher audit probability, and higher fine level resulted in higher tax compliance. Analysis of response times showed that participants in conditions of delayed feedback took longer to decide whether to comply or evade. Concerning acquisition of information, delayed feedback resulted in more frequent and longer attention to information on audit probability and fine rate compared to immediate feedback. In combination with perceiving delayed feedback as more unfair - as indicated in post-experimental questionnaires - this pattern of results can be interpreted as an indication of “aversive uncertainty”. |
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| responsibles | Saucet, Pejsachowicz |
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Workflow history| from state (1) | to state | comment | date |
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| submitted | published | | 2023/03/29 14:43 UTC |
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