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Emotions as value enablers| title | Emotions as value enablers |
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| start_date | 2023/02/07 |
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| schedule | 09h30-10h30 |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | meeting room |
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| summary | According to a recurring worry, the Fitting Attitude analysis of value would foster a revisionary understanding of value : by attempting to analyse value in terms of fitting responses, it would systematically betray the pretheoretical adicity of value. My discussion will focus on a recent attempt by advocates of the FA analysis to assuage the worry by casting emotions in the role of value enablers. While casting emotions in the role of enablers chimes well with how we pre-theoretically understand the relations between emotions and values, I observe that doing so requires that we tackle two connected issues. First, how do emotions function as value enablers ? Second, is the resulting picture compatible with the FA analysis ? The rest of the discussion is structured around these issues. I emphasize the existence of a contrast between how belief relates to truth and how emotions relate to values, a contrast which helps uncover what we are after. A first reaction to this contrast, according to which emotions are value enablers by allowing us to access values, which differ from truth, is then examined. I argue that this idea cannot do justice to the key insight of the FA analysis. Next, I defend an alternative idea, according to which emotions are enablers in virtue of their attitudinal shapes. |
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| oncancel | Annulé |
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| responsibles | Boisserie-Lacroix, Dokic |
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Workflow history| from state (1) | to state | comment | date |
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| submitted | published | | 2023/02/01 15:01 UTC |
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