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Empathy, imagination, and memory: How the simulation theory can explain that we empathize with emotions we have never experienced| title | Empathy, imagination, and memory: How the simulation theory can explain that we empathize with emotions we have never experienced |
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| start_date | 2023/04/18 |
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| schedule | 16h15-17h45 |
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| online | yes |
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| visio | https://univ-grenoble-alpes-fr.zoom.us/j/92229286091?pwd=aGpnKzBSRm5GdTRNdHQ1cEFhREx3Zz09 |
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| location_info | on Zoom |
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| summary | According to a widespread view, the simulation theory (ST) of empathy cannot explain how it is possible that we empathize with emotions we have never experienced. Indeed, if – as ST suggests – empathy is based on a re-enactment of the other’s emotions, empathy requires that we already know the emotion to re-enact. If we do not know the emotion, then we do not know what we have to re-enact and, as a result, empathy is not possible. The aim of my talk is to show that proponents of the simulation theory of empathy can avoid the objection using some findings of current imagination research. In fact, as I shall argue, by resorting to memories, our phenomenal imagination can make us accessible the phenomenal properties of emotions we have never experienced. If this is possible, then the objection against ST should be dismissed. |
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| responsibles | Righetti, Werning, Kourken, Andonovski |
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Workflow history| from state (1) | to state | comment | date |
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| submitted | published | | 2023/03/29 12:35 UTC |
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