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Mapping content| title | Mapping content |
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| start_date | 2023/05/30 |
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| schedule | 16h15-17h45 |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | on Zoom |
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| summary | We understand ourselves, and one another, from a rational perspective, through the attribution of conceptualmental states: belief, desire, etc. The attribution of conceptual mental states allows for the rational explanation of behavior as the result of practical inference. Are all mental states conceptual in the way that belief is? Some philosophers argue that perceptual experience is non-conceptual. In this talk, (drawn from joint work with Nir Fresco,) I argue that cognitive maps, our internal allocentric representations of the environment, comprise another important class of non-conceptual mental states. To this end, I shall present relevant discoveries of navigation science, evaluate extant arguments that cognitive maps are non-conceptual, and provide original arguments for that conclusion. There are two popular understandings of what it is for a mental state to be non-conceptual, the content view and the state view. While the former plausibly implies the latter, the converse remains controversial. Thus, I shall offer one argument to proponents of the content (and state) view(s), and a separate argument that can also appeal to those who endorse the state view and deny the content view. |
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| responsibles | Righetti, Werning, Kourken, Andonovski |
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Workflow history| from state (1) | to state | comment | date |
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| submitted | published | | 2023/04/27 14:26 UTC |
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