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Does absence perception plead in favour of the rich content view ?| title | Does absence perception plead in favour of the rich content view ? |
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| start_date | 2026/04/24 |
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| schedule | 11h-12h30 |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | pavillon jardin, meeting room |
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| summary | This paper brings together two lively debates within philosophy of perception, namely, the perceivability of absences and the range of perceptual content. My argument is based on the idea that, if absences are truly perceivable, as I claim to be the case, then the Conservative View about perceptual content is false. First, I briefly present the current debate on absence experience, outlining the three main views that have been advanced, namely the Cognitive, the Meta-Cognitive, and the Perceptual View. These views differ primarily in how they interpret the experience of absence — which, only according to the perceptualists, is the result of genuine perception rather than a mere mental inference. In line with the Perceptual View, I propose a novel account that explains why at least some absences can be genuinely perceived as perceptual contents of positive events’ perceptions. If successful, this account provides further support for a richer understanding of perceptual content in which higher-level properties can become part of our perceptual experiences. |
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| responsibles | NC |
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Workflow history| from state (1) | to state | comment | date |
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| submitted | published | | 2026/04/21 07:39 UTC |
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