Reliable reputations and interdependence in the gossip triad

titleReliable reputations and interdependence in the gossip triad
start_date2023/10/02
schedule09h15-12h
onlineno
location_infoRdC, bât. Jardin
summaryMany of society’s biggest policy challenges — reducing inequalities, protecting the environment, providing affordable and high-quality healthcare and education, encouraging participation in the democratic process — are social dilemmas in which individual interests are at odds with collective welfare. Reputation offers an inexpensive but effective solution: by knowing each other’s standing in a social group, their past behaviors, and inclinations it is possible to know who will likely cooperate and who will not. Reputation, through observability, is expected to improve accountability and then norm-following behavior. Evolutionary theories, such as indirect reciprocity and partner selection, lend support to the effectiveness of reputation-based cooperation. However, when transitioning from simple mathematical models to the complexities of human sociality, the potency of reputations is severely diminished. First, observability is seldom possible in large human groups, where reputations are based on gossip, which is not necessarily truthful or reliable. Second, reputations co-evolve with the network of relationships the agents are embedded in: in the process what is communicated can become completely disconnected from the observed behavior. The processes and outcomes of reputation are not well understood, with a significant gap between scholarly knowledge and real-life observations. The purpose of this presentation is to delineate the inadequacies of extant theories of reputation-based cooperation. Specifically, I will scrutinize the limitations of these theories and elucidate how they can be improved through an investigation of the gossip triad. The gossip triad encompasses the sender, receiver, and target, and provides the foundation for a theory of reliable reputation.
responsiblesAndré, Lie-Panis