|
Signaling your stake in others| title | Signaling your stake in others |
|---|
| start_date | 2023/10/02 |
|---|
| schedule | 09h15-12h |
|---|
| online | no |
|---|
| location_info | RdC, bât. Jardin |
|---|
| summary | Behavioural scientists have uncovered many evolutionary reasons for why humans cooperate with each other, but these functions of cooperation are mostly examined in isolation. Here I use fitness interdependence – i.e., organisms having a stake in each other’s welfare – to start examining how these causes of cooperation can interact with each other. First, I will present mathematical models and experimental studies showing that when people engage in reciprocity, they develop a stake in each other’s welfare, such that they will be willing to help even beyond the existing reciprocal relationship (e.g., anonymously). The more replaceable that partners are, the less willing that people are to help. Second, I will present mathematical models and experimental studies showing that acts of helping can signal one’s stake in a partner, such that people will trust others who are seen to value them (and are therefore likely to reciprocate any trust). This helping can include the provision of public goods, such as preserving the environment. Signaling one’s stake in others is an effective way of signaling one’s cooperative intent, such that fitness interdependence provides a connection between different causes of cooperation like reciprocity and signaling. As such, a better understanding of fitness interdependence can help unite our understanding of why people cooperate. |
|---|
| responsibles | André, Lie-Panis |
|---|
Workflow history| from state (1) | to state | comment | date |
|---|
| submitted | published | | 2023/09/20 12:40 UTC |
| |
|