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I own, therefore I move| title | I own, therefore I move |
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| start_date | 2023/09/22 |
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| schedule | Horaires non indiqués |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | Salle 530 |
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| summary | It is known that sense of agency SA (i.e., “this action is due to my own will”) is rooted in a variety of internal, motor-related, efferent signals (e.g., motor intentions, planning, sensorimotor predictions and so on). However, new evidence suggests that body-related (purely) afferent signals subserving body ownership BO (i.e., “this body is mine”) could have a role per se in building up human conscious awareness of willed actions.
I will present data from both brain damaged-patients and intact brain functioning strengthening this idea. Then, I will put forward the idea that, whenever requested by the context, BO can act on agency attribution (i.e., independently from efferent signals).
This, in turn, suggests that a coherent subjective experience of willed actions (i.e., “this willed action is being realized by my own body”) requires both awareness of being an agent and of owning the body. |
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| responsibles | Laboissière |
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Workflow history| from state (1) | to state | comment | date |
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| submitted | published | | 2023/09/21 07:55 UTC |
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