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Preference Games and Nash Equilibrium Play| title | Preference Games and Nash Equilibrium Play |
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| start_date | 2023/10/06 |
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| schedule | 11h15-12h30 |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | Room 115 |
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| summary | The Nash equilibrium is a widely used concept in Economics and many other sciences. However, in several situations it does not accurately predict behavior. Often the equilibrium prediction is based solely on the players’ own (material) payoffs, not including further relevant aspects like the payoffs other persons’ or the way of interaction. As a consequence, individual payoffs do not necessarily represent players’ utilities from the outcomes of the games. If this is the case, players may actually face a very different kind of strategic situation. To examine the latter aspect, we report results from two experimental studies. In both studies players’ (social) preferences over a set of monetary payoff pairs are elicited. These are identical to the outcomes of several simultaneous 2x2 games. This method allows us to identify the strategic properties of the corresponding “preference games”. In several cases those differ with respect to their original counterparts. In the first study, subjects then play a couple of those 2x2 games and the frequencies of equilibrium play in both types of games are compared. The second study extends this approach to all 2x2 games and provides a comprehensive overview how often a specific kind of game transforms into other game for all possible pairings of players (with known social preferences). |
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| responsibles | Le Lec, Pejsachowicz |
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Workflow history| from state (1) | to state | comment | date |
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| submitted | published | | 2023/09/27 14:08 UTC |
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