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Predictive Processing, Imagery and Imagination| title | Predictive Processing, Imagery and Imagination |
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| start_date | 2023/11/20 |
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| schedule | 10h-12h |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | Salle Camille Marbo |
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| summary | Several of the most prominent proponents (Hohwy 2013, Clark 2016) of predictive processing claim that predictive processing is particularly well placed to explain imagination : it involves generating the predictive hypothesis in a decoupled manner by turning down the gain on prediction error. As we proposed in Jones and Wilkinson (2020), this conflates imagery and imagination. While predictive processing might be good at explaining imagery, imagery is not sufficient for imagination, nor, arguably, is it even necessary. In this seminar I present the many things that a predictive processing account would need to accommodate in order to properly give an account of imagination. What emerges is a view of imagination that is both adverbialist (an organism is imagining if and only if they are doing something imaginatively) and enculturated (extended creative practices give rise to imagination and not vice versa). |
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| responsibles | Dokic, Arcangeli |
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Workflow history| from state (1) | to state | comment | date |
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| submitted | published | | 2023/09/26 14:16 UTC |
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