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Intentional Agency and Practical Knowledge| title | Intentional Agency and Practical Knowledge |
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| start_date | 2023/11/10 |
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| schedule | 11h |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | salle de réunion |
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| summary | In her ’Intention’, Elizabeth Anscombe famously claimed that agents, in acting intentionally, have non-observational, ’practical’ knowledge of their actions. Anscombe’s claim has found enthusiastic adherents, but many philosophers have remained skeptical. The situation between these groups has developed into something of a stalemate, since the positive arguments for Anscombe’s claim mostly come from a broadly Anscombean perspective on intentional agency, and are thus unlikely to persuade philosophers who are not already attracted to this perspective. By contrast, the question of whether the case for a necessary connection between intentional agency and non-observational, ’practical’ knowledge of the kind Anscombe envisages can be made on independent grounds is (with few exceptions) still relatively unexplored. In this talk, I will try to develop an qualified defense of Anscombe’s claim which aims to show that even philosophers attracted to a non-Anscombean ’standard’ picture of intentional agency have good reasons to accept her claim. |
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| responsibles | Buehler |
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Workflow history| from state (1) | to state | comment | date |
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| submitted | published | | 2023/11/07 16:27 UTC |
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