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Where Structuralism About Mental Representation Goes Wrong: Putting Structural Similarity in Its Place| title | Where Structuralism About Mental Representation Goes Wrong: Putting Structural Similarity in Its Place |
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| start_date | 2026/10/09 |
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| schedule | 11h |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | lunch room in the Physics building |
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| summary | Structuralism has emerged in recent decades as one of the leading theories of representation. The core idea of structuralism is that the content of representational states is grounded in a relation of second-order similarity between mind and word – a relation standardly called "structural similarity". In this talk, I first distinguish between two major versions of structuralism that are often conflated. I then argue that neither of these versions is tenable, and suggest an alternative, "subsidiary" role for structural similarity in the explanation of representational content. |
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| oncancel | Changement de lieu |
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| responsibles | Buehler |
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Workflow history| from state (1) | to state | comment | date |
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| submitted | published | | 2026/10/06 11:42 UTC |
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