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Toward a moderate simulationism| title | Toward a moderate simulationism |
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| start_date | 2023/10/12 |
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| schedule | 16h15-17h45 |
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| online | yes |
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| visio | https://univ-grenoble-alpes-fr.zoom.us/j/92229286091?pwd=aGpnKzBSRm5GdTRNdHQ1cEFhREx3Zz09 |
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| location_info | on Zoom |
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| summary | Simulationism is the claim that remembering is imagining an event in one’s personal past. This claim is ambiguous. In some instances, the claim is that the constructive episodic simulation system is composed of systems distinguishable by function but sharing a common source of stored information and having similar neural and cognitive underpinnings. On this reading, episodic remembering remains a possible natural kind and a proper object of the psychological and cognitive neurosciences. Yet in other instances, the claim is that there is a properly functioning, reliable system that aims at constructing episodic representations, full stop. On this reading, episodic remembering is not a natural kind, it is not a proper object of the psychological and cognitive neurosciences, and it ought to be eliminated in favor of the notion of constructive imagination as the most properly basic natural kind to be studied. Simulationist have been moving towards the second, eliminativist option. I argue that their reasons for having done so are inconsistent with simulationism as a naturalist project. And I argue that there are good methodological reasons to continue to treat episodic remembering as a possible natural kind and a proper object of the psychological and cognitive neurosciences at this stage in the process of discovery. |
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| responsibles | Righetti, Werning, Kourken, Andonovski |
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Workflow history| from state (1) | to state | comment | date |
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| submitted | published | | 2023/10/04 12:09 UTC |
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