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A theory of memory for the law| title | A theory of memory for the law |
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| start_date | 2023/11/23 |
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| schedule | 16h15-17h45 |
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| online | yes |
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| visio | https://univ-grenoble-alpes-fr.zoom.us/j/92229286091?pwd=aGpnKzBSRm5GdTRNdHQ1cEFhREx3Zz09 |
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| location_info | on Zoom |
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| summary | Several of the phenomena which philosophers discuss are also extremely important in the practical operation of the law: responsibility, causation, intention, and many others. Moreover, legal decision-makers, such as judges, often have to grapple with the same kinds of puzzles about these phenomena as philosophers do. A major difference, however, is that the discussions of legal decision-makers typically take place in a context where there is a need for finality. Some notion of responsibility, causation, intention, or whatever else needs to be settled on so that a decision can be made. So, while the discussions can be highly insightful, they cannot always proceed to the same level of detail and refinement as philosophical or other extra-curial discussions. Memory is also important for legal purposes. It is relevant to the reliability of witness testimony, to questions about mens rea, to certain issues in copyright law, and to the legal competence of testators, among many other legal issues. This has been discussed in a range of fields, but it has not received a great deal of attention in the philosophy of memory. Building on existing work across various disciplines, and focusing on both real and fictional case studies, I continue the search for a notion of memory adequate for the law. |
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| responsibles | Righetti, Werning, Kourken, Andonovski |
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Workflow history| from state (1) | to state | comment | date |
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| submitted | published | | 2023/11/16 14:04 UTC |
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