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Phenomenological interviews and the problem of our fallible episodic memory| title | Phenomenological interviews and the problem of our fallible episodic memory |
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| start_date | 2023/12/21 |
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| schedule | 16h15-17h45 |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | on Zoom |
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| summary | In this talk, I argue that qualitative research in general, and phenomenological interviews in particular, are no less reliable than other strands of empirical research. Qualitative interviews constitutively rely on the episodic memory of both researchers and informant. Indeed, all its data is generated through this cognitive function. Though episodic memory is notoriously unreliable, qualitative researchers usually proceed unperturbed to develop theory and discuss their results deriving from this source. In order to understand and defend my argument, I first provide some reflections on what qualitative research is. In particular, I focus on the constitution of experience from the perspective of phenomenology and draw out some ontological, epistemological, and methodological consequences. I then look at specific traditions within qualitative research, such as Petitmengin’s “Micro phenomenology” and Kvale & Brinkmann’s “Interviews” and criticize their reflections on reliability for failing to directly tackle problem of memory. To conclude, I suggest that, for the purposes of qualitative research methods, a phenomenological-hermeneutic conception of experience, coupled with a healthy dose of humility in one’s own methods and results, is the best response to the problem of our fallible episodic memory. |
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| responsibles | Righetti, Werning, Kourken, Andonovski |
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Workflow history| from state (1) | to state | comment | date |
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| submitted | published | | 2023/12/06 14:57 UTC |
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