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Logrolling affects the relative performance of alternative voting rules: Simulations and Experiments| title | Logrolling affects the relative performance of alternative voting rules: Simulations and Experiments |
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| start_date | 2024/03/08 |
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| schedule | 11h15-12h30 |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | Room 115 |
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| summary | Consider a group making binary decisions on “projects”, each of which yields a vector of randomly drawn payoffs for its members. Assuming that project payoffs are drawn from a distribution symmetric around zero, previous authors have observed that the application of simple majority rule maximizes a representative individual’s expected payoff if all members vote sincerely on each project. This observation has been used to develop a constitutional argument in support of majority rule. We argue that this argument is weakened if one assumes that group members may engage in logrolling agreements. If the number of projects considered is large enough, and if voters are sufficiently able to engage in such agreements, we predict that unanimity rule should outperform majority rule in an expected or aggregate payoff sense. This prediction is supported using computer simulations. We also conduct a laboratory experiment to assess the extent to which subjects engage in logrolling agreements under the two decision rules. The focus of the presentation will be on the experiment.****** Joint with Liza Charroin |
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| responsibles | Le Lec, Pejsachowicz |
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Workflow history| from state (1) | to state | comment | date |
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| submitted | published | | 2024/03/07 13:48 UTC |
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