| summary | Metacognition is the activity in which one performs epistemic self-appraisals in order to rationally allocate effort in learning, identify the sources of one's failures, and conduct efficient reasoning and planning. Appraisals are cognitive processes that allow an agent to compare a given observed outcome with the predicted one. Self-appraisals occur whenever one needs to know whether or not one's planned or executed action did or will attain its goal. Epistemic self-appraisals are those assessments that concern properties of one's cognitive contents such as veridicality (in the case of perception), accuracy or truth (in belief, memory, judgment etc.), soundness and relevance (in the case of reasoning), appropriateness and relevance (in the case of emotion).
The seminar will examine the status and possible origin of the epistemic norms used in epistemic self-appraisals. Are they hypothetical, instrumental norms relative to the basic epistemic goal of truth or true belief ? In which case, epistemic norms are norms of instrumental rationality, engineered on the basis of our actual or supposed epistemic means and circumstances. Or are they, rather, constitutive, objective constraints on information use in systems able to regulate their own cognitive parameters? It will also study the dynamics of epistemic norms and their interactions with other kinds of norms, such as aesthetic and moral norms.
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