The Arthropod Style of Cognition?

titleThe Arthropod Style of Cognition?
start_date2024/03/19
schedule11h-12h30
onlineno
location_infoSalle 6
summaryEmbodied vs. “Higher” Cognitive Explanations of Intelligent Behavior in Portia Jumping Spiders. This paper addresses the ongoing debate concerning the nature of intelligent behavior in Portia spiders, juxtaposing two predominant theories: the recent proposition of mental simulation ability by Cross et al. (2020), grounded in novel experiments on expectancy violation and numerosity, against the deflationary view advocating for embodied heuristics, primarily based on interpreting the (older) detour pre-planning experiments and research of Portia’s visual system (Barrett 2011, Tarsitano and Andrew 1998). We extend the embodied heuristics framework to encompass recent findings, specifically by drawing parallels with sequential scanning behaviors observed in bees, and thus offer a nuanced explanation that relies neither on the assumption of processes akin to mental simulation, nor solely on the mechanism posited by the deflationary account. Given the absence of direct neural evidence in Portia spiders that could reliably adjudicate the debate, and the sole reliance on behavioral observations in the experiments, we argue that neither the mental simulation model nor the embodied heuristics account could so far conclusively claim superiority. Moreover, we argue that Cross et al. do not in fact offer a positive case for preferring the simulation-based account. We also reject privileging the embodied heuristics account simply on the grounds of parsimony or simplicity of explanation. However, by leveraging an independent line of evidence from other arthropods, we advocate for the advanced embodied heuristics explanation, emphasizing the likelyhood of a shared "arthropod cognition toolkit." This approach not only aligns with the observed capacities of Portia spiders in the novel experiments but also challenges the necessity of positing cognitive abilities that are more akin to those found in mammals in explaining Portia spiders' intelligent behaviors. We thus propose a positive case for the embodiment-based explanation that can account for the novel experimental observations and offer a path forward to understanding the arthropod style of cognition.
responsiblesMoullard, Virenque