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Perception and justification| old_uid | 8151 |
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| title | Perception and justification |
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| start_date | 2010/02/12 |
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| schedule | 14h30-16h30 |
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| online | no |
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| summary | I have defended a belief theory of perceptual experience: Perceptual
experience, or so I argue, is best understood as a kind of belief. Such
beliefs have what I call phenomenal contents, contents like ‘that x looks
ed’ or ‘that it looks as if there was something square in front of me’. Crucially, this allows us to understand experience as providing defeasible inferential reasons for (further) belief. In this talk, I shall look at this account from an epistemological perspective: What is it for experience to provide - not only reasons, but - justification for (further) belief ? |
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| responsibles | Pacherie, Dokic, Proust |
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