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Children’s naïve understanding of truth and falsity| old_uid | 8339 |
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| title | Children’s naïve understanding of truth and falsity |
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| start_date | 2010/03/12 |
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| schedule | 14h |
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| online | no |
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| summary | This paper is an attempt to look into children’s naïve understanding of truth and falsity. It will be argued that while much research has been performed on children’s capacity to represent false beliefs (in particular using false belief task, e.g. Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005), the capacity to represent beliefs as false has not been properly investigated. Data suggesting that preschoolers can represent truth and falsity by the age of 3-year-old will be presented. It will be shown that by this age, children can apply truth and falsity assessments to utterances and to beliefs. Moreover, the capacity to handle second-order assessments of truth and falsity, (comment on the epistemic status of epistemic comments) will be evidenced by the age of four-year-old. These results will be taken as evidence of an explicit grasp of metarepresentation (representation of representation) and of misrepresentation well before four-year-old, the age at which children come to pass standard false belief tasks. |
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| responsibles | Pacherie, Dokic, Proust |
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