|
Vigilant Trust and Default Trust| old_uid | 8533 |
|---|
| title | Vigilant Trust and Default Trust |
|---|
| start_date | 2010/04/09 |
|---|
| schedule | 14h30-16h30 |
|---|
| online | no |
|---|
| summary | Knowledge is a collective good sustained by a thick bundle of trust relations. It
has become a platitude in social epistemology to acknowledge the role of trust in creating and sustaining knowledge as a form of distributed cognitive order (cf. Harwdig, 1985; Shapin 1994; Origgi 2004). It is less common, though, to precisely define our trust in others: whether it is based on social and moral values, or on cognitive capacities, or else on social and institutional devices designed to reinforce our reliance in the cognitive order of the society.
In this paper, I will argue that the stance of trust (cf. Origgi 2008; Holton 1994)
we take to gain benefits from other people's knowledge is neither a form of blind trust, nor a default social norm, but a rich, inferential competence that allows us to sort communicated information. Individuals and institutions that thrive in an information-dense society must display an epistemic vigilant attitude aimed at protecting them from the major risk of accidental or intentional misinformation.
I'll thus argue that vigilant trust and default trust are not two opposite
attitudes;rather, the stance of trust that sustain our permanent reliance on other
people's knowledge is possible thanks to the existence of a variety of devices that help us to shape the landscape of meaningful around us. Among these devices, I'll concentrate my analysis on the epistemic use of reputational and rating devices to sort information.
Ref.
J. Hardwig, 1991, "The Role of Trust in Knowledge", Journal of Philosophy, 88, 693-708
R. Holton, 1994, "Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe", Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 72, 63-76.
G. Origgi, 2004, "Is Trust an Epistemological Notion?", Episteme, 1, 56-75.
G. Origgi, 2007, "Trust, Authority and Epistemic Responsibility", Theoria, 61, 35-44.
S. Shapin, 1994, A Social History of Truth, University of Chicago Press. |
|---|
| responsibles | Pacherie, Dokic, Proust |
|---|
| |
|