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Psychological Experiments and Phenomenal Experience in Size and Shape Constancy| old_uid | 12565 |
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| title | Psychological Experiments and Phenomenal Experience in Size and Shape Constancy |
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| start_date | 2013/06/06 |
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| schedule | 17h-19h |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | salle Pasteur |
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| summary | This paper concerns the interaction between theoretical aims in the study of perception and the experimental design of specific types of perceptual experiment. It focuses on experiments that aim to measure perceivers’ phenomenal experiences of objects, in distinction from their cognitive assessments of object properties. It uses this distinction to respond to Pizlo’s recent challenge to work in the psychology of shape perception. Pizlo (2008) claims that all work on shape perception prior to 1985 rested on a mistake that caused investigators to confuse problems of shape ambiguity with problems of shape constancy. In reply, I suggest that Pizlo has understood neither the aim of work on shape constancy nor the logic of experimental design used in those studies. More specifically, I argue that Pizlo has not properly understood the goal of studying phenomenal experience, how things look; he has assimilated the goal of perception entirely to object recognition, or, if not that, to the recovery of viewpointless representations of shape. Shape constancy work has sought to determine how shapes appear from a given viewpoint, which may or may not yield a correct recognition of the shape, depending on stimulus conditions. I then examine the application of similar experimental methods to size perception, again seeking to disentangle the perception of size from cognitive estimates of size. |
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| responsibles | Niveleau, Bitbol |
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