| summary | La métacognition recouvre le domaine de la pensée sur la pensée. Elle est présente dans toutes les activités cognitives au cours desquelles le sujet tente d’apprécier rétrospectivement le résultat d’une opération cognitive (« Est-ce que j’ai oublié quelque chose ? », « Ce que j’ai dit est-il cohérent ? ») ou de prédire s’il pourra atteindre un certain but cognitif (par exemple, apprendre une liste de mots, retrouver un nom propre, ou planifier une action dans un environnement incertain). La métacognition intervient quand on doit contrôler et assurer le suivi de ses propres états cognitifs, typiquement en vue d’évaluer si ce qu’on croit est vrai ou plausible, et de décider où investir ses ressources mentales (en particulier, son attention). Les normes impliquées dans le contrôle métacognitif concernent l’adéquation cognitive des événements mentaux, c’est-à-dire l’ensemble des conditions normatives qu’un événement mental doit satisfaire pour atteindre un but mental particulier (se souvenir, raisonner, apprendre, se concentrer, etc.). Ces conditions sont a) normatives en tant qu’elles s’appuient sur des conditions de correction acquises implicitement dans des actions mentales du même type; b) prédictives en tant que, complétées par l’observation des dispositions présentes, elles annoncent le résultat attendu. La comparaison entre a) et b) cause et justifie la décision d’agir ou de ne pas agir (en vertu des conditions normatives et des dispositions observées).
Le séminaire s’intéressera aux diverses formes d’adéquation cognitive dont l’intervention métacognitive assure le contrôle et le suivi, ainsi qu’aux formes d’expérience et de raisonnements qui les rendent possibles. Il portera également sur des problèmes ontologiques et épistémologiques soulevés par l’existence même de sentiments métacognitifs (comme le sentiment de connaître la réponse à une question, avant même de la donner). On se demandera si de tels sentiments s’apparentent davantage à des émotions, à des jugements, à des impressions cognitives, ou à de simples sensations dénuées d’intentionnalité intrinsèque. On se posera aussi la question de leur statut épistémique. Les sentiments épistémiques sont-ils des formes sophistiquées d’illusion cognitive, ou sont-ils suffisamment fiables pour nous autoriser à former sur leur base des jugements sur nos propres états et processus mentaux ? À supposer que les sentiments épistémiques soient fiables (au moins dans certains contextes), quelle relation entretiennent-ils aux états mentaux de 1er ordre (par exemple, un souvenir) dont ils révèlent l’existence et peut-être quelques autres propriétés ? Par exemple, lorsque nous avons le vrai nom de Mark Twain « sur le bout de langue » (le phénomène « TOT » (pour « tip of the tongue »), sommes-nous directement conscients du souvenir de 1er ordre qui véhicule l’information pertinente (Rosenthal, 2000) ? La réponse à ces questions aura des répercussions importantes sur notre conception philosophique de la conscience. On peut se demander si l’existence de sentiments épistémiques contredit la thèse selon laquelle nous ne sommes véritablement conscients que du contenu intentionnel de nos états mentaux (Tye, 2000), ou la thèse moins forte selon laquelle nous ne pouvons prendre conscience de leur mode qu’après avoir rendu leur contenu explicite (Dienes & Perner, 1999).
Metacognition and epistemic entitlement
Metacognition refers to the vast area of thinking about thinking. It is exemplified in all the cognitive activities through which one is trying to appreciate in retrospect a cognitive achievement (“Did I forget something?” “Was what I said coherent?”), or to predict whether one will be able to accomplish some cognitive goal (learn a new material, retrieve a proper name or make efficient plans for reaching a goal in an uncertain environment). Metacognition occurs when one must control and monitor one’s own cognitive states, typically to evaluate whether what one believes is true, or plausible, and decide where to invest one’s mental (in particular, attentional) resources. The norms that are involved in metacognitive control can be captured under the general term of cognitive adequacy. By that term is meant the set of normative conditions that a mental event must generally fulfill in order to secure a specific mental goal (remembering, reasoning, learning, concentrating etc.). These conditions are 1) normative because they express conditions of correction that were implictly acquired in mental actions of the same type; b) predictive because, on the basis of current dispositions, they allow to expect a certain outcome. Comparison between a) and b) is what causes and justifies the decision to act or not (depending on the normative conditions and the observed dispositions).
This seminar will study the various forms of cognitive adequacy that metacognitive intervention allows to control and monitor. It will also examine the forms of experience and of reasoning that make it possible. Another area of discussion will concern ontological and epistemological problems raised by the very existence of metacognitive feelings (such as the feeling of knowing the answer to some question, even before giving it). One will ask whether such feelings are more akin to emotions, judgments, cognitive impressions, or mere sensations devoid of intrinsic intentionality. One will also raise the question of their epistemic status. Are epistemic feelings sophisticated forms of cognitive illusion, or are they reliable enough to warrant judgments about one’s own mental states and processes? On the assumption that they are reliable (at least in some contexts), what is their relationship to the first-order mental states (for instance, memories) whose existence they reveal to their subject, perhaps along some properties? For instance, when one has the real name of Mark Twain “on the tip of one’s tongue”, is one directly conscious of a first-order memory carrying the relevant piece of information (Rosenthal, 2005)? Answers to these questions have important consequences on the adequate philosophical account of consciousness. In particular, one will ask whether the existence of epistemic feelings is a threat to the claim that we can be directly conscious only of the intentional contents of one’s mental states (Tye, 2000), or to the weaker claim that one can be conscious of the mode of one’s states only after their contents have been made explicit (Dienes & Perner, 1999).
Bibliographie sélective/Selected bibliography
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